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I. INTRODUCTION 
In Chinese M & A, tender offer is a common way. Despite several 
amendments and revisions on the Company Law, Securities Law and 
the Takeover Measures, the current Chinese regulations on tender offer 
is rather complicated than thorough. This article scrutinizes the 
Mandatory Bid Rule, sell-out right and the exemption of tender offer 
in Chinese tender offers and then provides concrete suggestions for 
future improvement in M & A regulations. 
Keywords: Tender Offer; Mandatory Bid Rule; Sell-out Right; 
Exemption of Tender Offer; M & A; Acquirer. 
I. BACKGROUNDS 
In the M & A domain, corporate law scholars have debated for years 
the fiduciary duties of the board of directors, the rationality of anti-
takeover measures, the gap between a court-dominant supervisory 
framework (us) and a s~lf-regulatory system (uk), the balance between 
the acquirers and management board and so on. Yet heretofore very 
few researchers have examined deeply the technical rules in M & A. 
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This article attempts to fil this void in the literature through a careful 
scrutiny into the current Chinese tender offer regulation. 
The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (hereinafter the City Code) 
of UK in 1968 brought up a systematic regulation on tender offers. 
Tender offer as a principle way of acquisition was then adopted first 
(1) 
in Anglo-Saxon countries and then in Asia. In 1993, China established 
its national stock exchange. In Interim Provisions on the Management 
of the Issuing and Trading of Stocks, the State Council unequivocally 
(2) 
clarified tender offer as a major way of company acquisitions. Hereafter, 
the State Council and the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
successively promulgated the Chinese Company Law, Securities Law and 
Measures for the Administration of the Takeover of Listed Companies 
(hereinafter the Takeover Measure). After several amendments and 
revisions, the current Chinese regulations on tender offer is rather 
complicated than thorough. 
Like UK and most EU member states, China has a Mandatory Bid 
Rule requiring acquirers holding securities of a listed company to a 
certai~level launch an overall tender offer for al the outstanding 
(3) 
shares of the target company. UK's Mandatory Bid Rule has a trigger 
(4) 
of 30% voting rights, which is the same with the majority of EU 
(6) 
member states. China also set its Mandatory Bid Rule trigger at 30% 
level, but this 30% consists of 30% of the issued shares and 30% of the 
(6) 
total shares. Moreover, consequence of triggering the Mandatory Bid 
Rule is different according to how the acquirer crossed the 30% line in 
(7) 
the first place. 
Compare with this overcomplicated Mandatory Bid Rule, the sell-out 
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right in Chinese tender offer is even more problematic. The Sell-out 
right originally comes from the EU. The Directive 2004/25/Ec Of The 
European Parliament And Of The Council On Takeover Bids (hereinafter 
the European Directive) provides minority shareholders with a sell-out 
right. If a bidder has obtained securities representing 90% of the capital 
carrying voting rights and 90% of the voting rights in the target 
company in a takeover, shareholders can require the majority shareholder 
(8) 
bidder to buy out al th・ eir secun ties. Dra wmg experience from EU, 
the Chinese Securities Law stipulates that shareholders can sel out 
their shares to an acquirer if the takeover bid causes the target company 
(9) 
losing its listing status. In China, the equity distribution requirement 
(10) 
for listed company is very strict; small listed companies must have 
their public-offered shares more than 25% of its total shares, while 
companies with registered capital over 400 million must have more than 
(11) 
10% public-offered shares. The prevalent non-public shares in Chinese 
listed companies give rise to the fact that the sell-out right trigger is 
(12) 
much lower than 90% in China. 
As deficient as the Chinese sell-out right is the exemptions of 
Mandatory Bid Rule in China. Exemptions of Mandatory Bid Rule has 
two types: application-based exemptions and the non-application-needed 
exemptions. Under extreme circumstances, acquirers do not even have 
to apply to get exemptions from the Mandatory Bid Rule. In conditions 
where the acquirer do have to apply to the China Security Regulatory 
(13) 
Commission (hereinafter CSRC) for the exemption, relevant regulations 
(14) 
are either too loose or too vague. Investors with ulterior motives can 
easily exploit those loopholes for obtaining corporate control, and once 
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an applicant has obtained exemption from the Mandatory Bid Rule, 
he could find a way to circumvent tender offer forever. This leaves 
abundant room for majority shareholders to outsmart and outmaneuver 
(15) 
minority shareholders. 
All in al, current Chinse tender offer regulation incorporates a 
Mandatory Bid Rule too intricate and a sell-out right triggered too low; 
in addition, regulations on exemptions of the Mandatory Bid Rule in 
China are riddled with ambiguous articles as well as confusing 
explanations. This paper deeply examines the Chinese law in tender 
offer regulation, compares its substances with its counterpart in UK 
and EU, and offers material suggestions for future improvement. The 
rest of this article proceeds as follows. Part I briefly introduces three 
statutory ways of acquisition in Chinese law. Part N gives a thorough 
review of the Mandatory Bid Rule in China. Part V illustrates the 
deficiency of Chinese sell-out right. Part VI carefully analyzes the 
exemptions of tender offer in China. Part VIl discusses the future 
improvements for tender offer regulation in China and Part V1I concludes. 
II. THREE STATUTORY WAYS OF ACQUISITION IN 
CHINA 
According to Chinese Securities Law, an investor may acquire a listed 
(16) 
company through tender offer, negotiations or other lawful means. 
If an investor adopts the means of tender offer to purchase shares 
of a listed company on his wil, he may choose to either send out a 
general tender offer for al outstanding shares of the company, or 
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send out a partial tender offer for part of the. company shares. Either 
(17) 
way the tender off er is to al shareholders of the listed company. 
Tender offer provides shareholders with adequate protection and 
certainty. According to Chinese Law, in tender offers, the price of the 
shares must not be lower than the highest price at which the purchaser 
(18) 
obtains within 6 months before the tender offer, and shareholders can 
choose either cash or equitable legal transferable securities at their 
(19) 
wil. Normally, the open term for the tender offer is no less than 30 
(20) 
days and no more than 60 days. When the term of tender offer expires, 
the purchaser have to purchase al the preliminarily accepted shares. 
In partial tender offers, if there are more accepted shares than needed, 
the purchaser shall purchase the shares according to the sellers' 
(21) 
shareholding ratio. Those safeguarding provisions in Chinese law 
protects shareholders from coercive tender offers and ensure al 
shareholders are treated equally in takeovers. 
Compare with tender offer, share-purchases through negotiations or 
other lawful means are usually more private, and do not necessarily 
have to alarm the public shareholders until the transaction is done or 
is inevitably to be done. In this way, it is more efficient and of lower 
cost for the acquirers. In 2014 Takeover Measure, acquisition of a listed 
company through other lawful means refers to as indirect takeovers. 
In indirect takeovers, the participant is not a shareholder of the company, 
but he was entitled to securities carrying 5% to 30% voting rights 
(22) 
through investment relationship, agreement or any other arrangement. 
Acquisitions through negotiations or any other lawful means seem to 
have very litle to do with minority shareholders. 
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In theory, acquisitions through tender offer are usually shareholders-
friendly but management-harmful, as the acquirers could bypass the 
management and hunt for control of the company directly; on the 
contrary, acquisitions through negotiations. or other means are pro 
management in nature and deprive public shareholders of the opportunity 
(23) 
to exit with a share premium. Although in major Anglo-American 
countries, acquisition through tender offer is the mainstream, in China, 
acquisitions thorough negotiations or other means are much more 
common. 
IV. THE CHINESE MANDATORY BID RULE 
Through whatever means of acquisition, when an acquirer or investor 
holds 30% of the issued shares of a listed company, further acquisition 
(24) 
of the company shares must via tender offer. China transplanted this 
Mandatory Bid Rule from European countries to protect the lawful 
rights and interests of the minority shareholders. 
A. The Mandatory Bid Rule in UK and EU 
In UK, the City Code clearly mandates that "any person, or together 
with persons acting in concert with him, acquires shares carrying 30% 
or more of the voting rights of a company whether by a series of 
transactions over a period of time or not" , shall launch an overall 
(25) 
tender off er for al the outstanding shares of the target company. In 
EU, the European Directive has similar clauses. When natural or legal 
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person holds securities of a listed company to a certain level, mandatory 
bid through tender offer "shall be addressed at the earliest opportunity 
(26),, 
to al the holders of those securities for al their holdings . In US, the 
Williams Act of United $tates has no such Mandatory Bid Rule, it 
only requires al the shareholders to be treated equally in a fair 
manner, and acquirers shall purchase shares on a pro rata basis if the 
(27) 
preliminary accepted shares exceed their estimat10n. 
In UK, once the acquirer obtained 30% of the voting rights of the 
company, the Mandatory Bid Rule applies. The European Council allows 
every member states to determine the "percentage of voting rights 
(28) 
which confers control" according to their own circumstances, thus the 
(29) 
trigger of the member states varies from lowest 25% to highest 66%. 
Interestingly, in Denmark and Estonia, there is no fixed number of the 
Mandatory Bid Rule trigger, the rule applies whenever the acquirer 
"holds the majority of voting rights in the company or becomes 
entitled to appoint or dismiss a majority of the members of the board 
(30),, 
of directors . Despite the minute threshold difference between UK and 
EU member states, once the Mandatory Bid Rule is triggered, the 
acquirer has to bid for al the company shares through a general 
tender offer; no partial tender offer is allowed except extreme conditions. 
B. The Mandatory Bid Rule in China 
In contrast with UK and EU, partial tender offer is an important 
part of the current Chinese Mandatory Bid Rule. Only in rare situations 
does the acquirer have to send out general tender offers. 
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Furthermore, while China has a "30% trigger" of Mandatory Bid 
Rule just like UK and most EU member states, the Chinese 30% trigger 
contains 30% of the issued shares and 30% of the total shares, and the 
consequences of the Mandatory Bid Rule are different accordingly. In 
Chinese listed companies, noncurrent shares are very common. The 
Share Split Reform from 2005 made most of the non-tradable shares 
tradable, but a large fraction of shares are stil strictly restricted from 
(31) 
selling even until now. As we will explain in the following context, the 
prevalent existence of noncurrent shares made the discrepancy between 
30% issued shares and 30% total shares rather huge. Meanwhile, the 
consequence of the Mandatory Bid Rule is also different, depending on 
how the acquirer reached the trigger in the first place. 
1 . Acquisition through Tender Offer 
If a purchaser reaches 30% of the issued shares of a listed company 
by securities trading at the stock exchange or by tender offer from 
the beginning, the purchaser can freely choose to send out either a 
(32) 
general tender offer or a partial offer for further acquisition. The 
proportion of target shares through a partial off er shall not be less 
(33) 
than 5% of the issued shares of the listed company. Meanwhile, if this 
purchaser reaches 30% of the total shares of the listed company, he can 
stil freely choose to send out a partial tender offer increasing no less 
than 5% shares. 
It is not hard to conclude that, for tender offer acquirers, the 
Mandatory Bid Rule is quite loose. Partial tender offer is applicable 
at both 30% of the issued shares and 30% of the total shares level. 
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Furthermore, even if the purpose of the acquirer is to delisting the 
listed company through takeover, this acquirer stil does not have to 
send out a general offer, al he needs to do is to unconditionally accept 
al the preliminarily accepted shares including those exceed the acquirer's 
(34) 
designated amount. 
2 . Acquisition through Negotiations 
If a purchaser reaches 30% of the issued shares of a listed company 
through negotiations, the purchaser can freely choose to send out either 
(35) 
a general tender offer or a partial offer for further acquisition. However, 
once his shareholding reaches 30% of the total shares of the company, 
(36) 
he has to send out a general offer for al shares of the company. The 
refore, for acquirers through negotiations, the Mandatory Bid Rule is 
relatively strict. Once the acquirer reaches 30% of the total shares of 
the company, the only way to further increase his shareholding is 
general tender offer. 
3 . Acquisition through Other Lawful Means 
If any person is entitled to 30% of the issued shares of a listed 
company through any lawful means other than acquisition through 
tender offer or negotiation, then this obligee has to send out a general 
(37) 
offer for al shares of the company. In conclusion, the Mandatory Bid 
Rule is most strict for indirect acquirers. From 30% of the issued shares 
on, general tender offer has become compulsory. 
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Table 1. The Mandatory Bid Rule in China 
Purchase Through Purchase Through Purchase Through 
Tender Off er Negotiations ther Lawful Means 
30% of Issued Partial Tender Partial Tender General Tender 
Share Offer Offer Offer 
30% of Total Partial Tender General Tender General Tender 
Share Offer Offer Offer 
To sum up, the Chinese Mandatory Bid Rule requires acquirers holding 
30% of the issued shares and acquirers holding 30% of the total shares 
sending out either partial tender offer or general tender offer under 
different circumstances, for part or al outstanding shares of the 
company. In other words, whenever an acquirer or investor, individually 
or collectively, steps over the 30% issued shares line, tender offer seems 
to be the only legitimate way of acquisition; but whether a general 
tender offer is compulsory varies from case to case. 
Obviously, partial tender offer is more cost-efficient than general 
(38) 
tender off er. After al, general tender off er is way too money consuming 
and usually leads to the failure of whole takeover attempt. On the 
other hand, the general tender offer can provide shareholders with far 
more certainty and convenience by ensuring al shareholders have the 
(39) 
equal chance to sel out their shareholdings at a premmm. Under current 
Chinese law, stepping over the 30% trigger point through normal 
security trading or tender offer provides acquirers in China with the 
legitimate right to send out a partial offer in takeovers instead of 
having to bid for al the outstanding shares. From this aspect, the 
Chinese Mandatory Bid Rule is more acquirer-friendly than shareholder-
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supreme; it promotes hostile takeovers from happening at the cost of 
minority shareholder protection. In reality, in partial tender offers, 
when preliminarily accepted shares exceed the purchasers'original plan, 
certam percentage of shares are detained in the hands of shareholders, 
price of which may very possible plummet after the takeover. In addition, 
the minority shareholder further may take a heavy tol once an acquirer 
chasing short-term gain consolidates its control power of the target 
company, as repeatedly observed in Chinese security market. 
V. THE CHINESE SELL-OUT RIGHT 
Under certain conditions, a full-scope general tender offer may become 
mandatory after a partial tender offer takeover. The Takeover Guideline 
and the 2014 Securities Law simultaneously endow minority shareholders 
with the right to empty their shareholdings when the equity distribution 
of the target company does not conform to the requirements for listing 
in stock exchanges any more. The shareholders other than the acq uirer 
who stil holds shares of the target company have the right to sel 
their shares to the acquirer who caused the alternation of equity 
distribution under the same conditions in the partial tender offer and 
(40) 
the acquirer must purchase al those shares. In・other words, if the 
acquirer purchase the shares of a listed company through partial tender 
offer to the extent that the company is no longer eligible for listing, 
then the partial tender offer ultimately becomes a general tender offer, 
and the acquirer is responsible for al the shares that other shareholders 
want to sel. Those shares remained in other shareholders'hands are 
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either the shares shareholders did not plan to sel originally, or the 
preliminarily accepted shares that exceeds the acquirer's designated 
amount in previous tender offer; and now, they al become the acquirers' 
liability. 
A. The Sell-out Right in the European Directive and Chinse Law 
The Chinese stipulation is quite similar to the sell-out right specified 
in the European Directive. The Takeover Directive offers minority 
shareholders a sell-out right enabling them to require the majority 
shareholder bidder to buy their securities following a takeover offer if 
the bidder holds securities representing 90% of the capital carrying 
voting rights and 90% of the voting rights in the target company. This 
sell-out right goes hand in hand with a squeeze-out right that allows 
a majority shareholder bidder to require the remaining minority 
(41) 
shareholders to sel out their shareholdings at a fair consideration. 
Under either situation, the acquirer (or the majority shareholder) must 
pay for a reasonable share price in cash or the same transferable 
security in the previous tender offer. The right of sell-out and squeeze-
out is a preemptory norm for al member states. Shareholders can 
exercise these rights within three months after the tender offer takeover. 
In practice, while most member states has a 90% threshold for the sel-
out and squeeze-out right, over one fourth member states increased th 
(42) 
eir threshold to 95%; Latvia and Luxenberg set a 90% threshold for the 
(43) 
sell-out right and 95% threshold for the squeeze-out right. 
In China, the sell-out right does not have a squeeze-out right 
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correspondingly, and the sell-out right itself is not entitled directly to 
shareholders. Every member state of the EU has a specific threshold 
for shareholders to exercise the sell-out right, but in China, the sel-
out right triggers "automatically" once the company loses its listing 
status, regardless of the bidder's shareholding percentage, nor the 
public shareholders'will. 
Article 51 of the 2014 Securities Law illustrates the requirement of 
equity distribution if a company wants to be officially "listed". The 
public-offered shares shall be more than 25% of the total shares of the 
company; and for companies with a registered capital over 400 million 
RMB, the percentage of its public-offered shares shall not be less than 
(44) 
10% of its total shares. 
The public-offered shares refer to shares held by public individuals 
(45) 
rather than legal persons or institut10ns. Suppose a small listed company 
with 100% circulating shares (an "absolute public" company). According 
to the Chinese Law, if any acquirers obtained 75% of the company share, 
the company is no longer eligible for listing, and the acquirer has to 
afford al the remaining shares of the company. In this case, the 
threshold for shareholders exercising their sell-out right is 75%. However, 
in most listed companies in China, legal persons and institutional 
investors usually possess a certain percentage of shares, and most listed 
(46) 
companies more or less have some non-public shares, thus the threshold 
for exercising the sell-out right of public shareholders is even lower 
than 75%. In extreme situations, a company may not be eligible for 
listing if any acquirers obtained even less than 30% of the issued 
(47) 
shares. 
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B. Shortage of the Chinese Sell-out Right 
In any Case, the acquirer should not be the only one to bear the 
consequences of listed company going private. When purpose of the 
acquirer is to delist the target company, it is reasonable that the 
acquirer shall unconditionally accept al the preliminarily accepted 
shares including those exceed the acquirer's designated amount, but 
demanding the acquirer to swallow al the company shares simply 
because the ownership distribution fals out of the listing norm is not 
reasonable at al. For instance, an acquirer with 30% shares planned 
to further purchase 5% shares through tender offer; meanwhile, other 
majority shareholders with more than 5% shares of the company slightly 
increase their shareholding by, say 4.99%, which is slightly below the 
(48) 
5% line to make public announcement. Under this circumstance, if the 
company loses its listing status, requiring the acquirer alone to buy 
out al the trivial shares is not fair at al, because al other majority 
shareholders are together responsible for the status quo. 
The judicial purpose of sell-out right is to protect the rights and 
interests of minority shareholders by offering them a fair opportunity 
to decently exit. In European countries, for a bidder with 90% of the 
capital carrying voting rights and 90% of the voting rights in the 
target company, taking care of the rest 10% is not a big deal. However, 
in China, the bidder has to take care of the remaining 25% and usually 
more shares of the company, yet very possible the bidder is stil far 
away from being a "controlling shareholder" when this happens. In 
China and most countries, very few acquirers intend to buy out a 
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whole company in takeovers, other usually only bid for lowest necessary 
proportion of shares. After al, acquisitions are too costly and every 
penny counts. In China, the bidder is responsible for formally reporting 
to CSRC about the quantity and proportion of the designated shares, 
amount of capital required for the takeover, and sources and guarantees 
(49) 
of capital before sending out tender offer. They have to prove that 
they are financially sustainable for the designated tender offer. 
Nonetheless, most of the acquirers are far from well prepared for the 
remaining shares after the tender offer. Without enough funds, the 
sell-out right of shareholders is just words on page, yet it is not realistic 
for the law to require al acquires preparing enough money for al 
outstanding shares of the company in partial tender offers. 
In some cases, the amount of the remaining shares is even bigger 
than the amount of shares the acquirer predetermined to bid. 
Compulsorily requiring the bidder to satisfy the sell-out right of the 
shareholders may result in the acquirers'opportunistic behavior, forcing 
them to dismantle the target company for quick cash. 
Even if the acquirer do have to ability to afford the remaining shares, 
and obtained 100% shares of the target company in the end, it may 
stil not be a good thing -the originally-was equity investor is now 
forced to be responsible for a business he is not fully familiar with. 
This may in turn hurt the company in the end, for the company may 
achieve greater development under the control, or joint-control of 
former industry professionals. Indeed, when exercising the sell-out 
right, the minority shareholders'interests are under through protection 
and they can exit the company in a fair manner, but the costs are 
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long-term interests of the employees, creditors, affiliated companies and 
others who bear connections with the target company. 
VI. THE EXEMPTION OF TENDER OFFER IN CHINA 
The Sell-out right is just tip of the iceberg of a problematic tender 
offer regulation, and・the exemptions of the tender offer in China 
constitute the rest part. While in the law of UK or EU exempts acquirers 
from the "Mandatory Bid Rule" in certain conditions, the Chinese Law 
directly exempts acquirers from the tender offer. 
A. Two Types of Tender Offer Exemption in China 
In China, there are two types of tender offer exemptions -application-
(50) 
based exemptions and non-application-needed exemptions. 
Normally, the investors and its concerted parties have to apply to 
the CSRC for the exemption of tender offer, and CSRC shall respond 
to the application within 20 days by explicitly granting the exemption 
(51) 
or passively not bringing any objections. However, under certain 
circumstances, investors and its concerted parties can skip the application 
to CSRC, and go through the procedures of share transfer and registration 
directly, in Stock Exchange and in China Securities Depository and 
Clearing Corporation Limited (CSDC) respectively. 
The circumstances are as follows. First, if the exemption of tender 
offer is approved by non-affiliated shareholders on general assembly 
of shareholders, plus the investor with more than 30% of the company 
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share promises not to transfer the shares within 3 years. Second, 
investor with more than 30% of the company share promises not to 
increase its shareholding than 2% every 12 months in the future. Third, 
investor with more than 50% shares increases its shareholdings of the 
company to a lesser extent that the status of a public listed company 
is on the hazard. Under those three situations mentioned above, the 
investors do not have to inform CSRC to make the share transfer. In 
addition, if the investor stamped the 30% line for reasons independent 
of his wil, for instance, fulfillment of formerly agreed share repurchases 
schemes, inheritance, common brokerage and loan business of financial 
entities or retrieve of voting rights of the preferred stock, then application 
(52) 
to CSRC for exemption is also not necessary. 
Except the circumstances mentioned above, when stepping over the 
30% mandatory bid line, investors and its concerted party have to 
make formal written applications to CSRC for the exemption of tender 
offer. The application-based exemptions also have two categories -
exemptions from increasing shares by means of tender off er and 
exemptions from sending a tender off er to al shareholders of the 
target company. 
Purchaser can apply to CSRC for the exemption from increasing 
shares by means of tender offer in the following two situations. First, 
if the purchaser and transferor can prove that the share transfer will 
not cause alternation of control, as th~transaction itself is in-between 
the entities under the same actual controller. Second, if the listed 
company is in serious financial distress and the investor intends to 
save the company through a reorganization scheme approved by the 
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general assembly of shareholders. Investor with a reorganization scheme 
must promise not to transfer its shares to any party within three 
(53) 
years. 
Upon receiving the application, CSRC shall clearly grant or refuse 
the exemption within 20 working days. If CSRC rejects the exemption 
application, the investor and its concerted party shall either reduce 
their shareholding to 30% or les, or send out a general tender offer 
to al shareholders to bid for al outstanding shares if they persist to 
acquire more shares of the target company. If the exemption is granted, 
not only can the investor freely bid for any proportion of shares 
(more than 5%) through tender offer, but he can also increase his 
shareholding through means other than tender off er as well. Generally, 
negotiated acquisitions are much more preferred than acquisitions through 
(54) 
tender offer, as it is less cost-consuming but more time-efficient. 
Purchaser can apply to CSRC for the exemption from sending a 
tender offer when gratuitous transfer, alternation or combination of 
state-owned assets approved by the government or the State-owned 
Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) of the 
State Council causes the 30% shareholding fact. In addition, a security 
holder does not have to send out a tender offer at al, if his shares 
exceed 30% of the issued shares of the company due to shareholder 
assembly approved share repurchase aiming at reducing the public share 
circulation. Upon sending the application, if the security holder does 
not receive any objections from the CSRC within 10 days, then the 
security holder can fulfil the share transfer and registration process 
directly without sending any tender offer. In fact, applicants for the 
56 Technical Rules in Chinese M & A : A Scrutiny (唐）
exemption from sending a tender offer are just normal securities holders, 
rather than purchasers or acquirers of the listed company; they hardly 
have any intentions to increase their shareholdings, not to mention 
(55) 
acquiring the whole company. 
In short, Chinese law grant investors the right to exempt tender 
offers when: first, share purchase that will not cause transfer of control 
of the company; second, acquisition of shares approved by general 
assembly of shareholders; third, long-term shareholder increases its 
shareholding in a gentle manner; fourth, share-increase beyond the 
investors'will. 
B. Loopholes and Deficiencies of Tender Offer Exemption 
The logic and reason behind current tender offer exemption regulation 
is obvious. The law is to prevent acquirers from taking advantage of 
the tender offer exemption for short-term disproportionate return. 
First, when share purchase will not cause transfer of the control, it 
seems that the stabilization and sustainable development of the company 
is insusceptible; the production and management activity almost remain 
exactly the way they were. It is especially true when the actual 
controller himself increases his shareholding -firmer control of the 
company means less constraint in decision-making. Second, in acquisitions 
approved by general assembly of shareholders, the acquirers usually 
act for either the interest of the major shareholders or the long-term 
benefits of the company; the acquirer has no hostile intentions and his 
acquisition is via friendly negotiations and considerations. Third, investors 
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promise not to transfer their share within three years have no chance 
to gain from short-term plunder behavior, they have bind themselves 
with the future three years'development of the target company. Fourth, 
a shareholder increases its shareholding slowly at least ostensibly 
indicates that temporarily he has no intentions for corporate control. 
At a speed limit of no more than 2% every 12 months, corporate raiders 
with high leverage-ratio capitals or those intend to dismantle the 
company for sale can do nothing but to give up their evil notion. Fifth, 
if increase of the share is beyond the security holders'will, it is hard 
to imagine that the security holders will make a fuss out of it. 
At first glance, those regulations indeed can ensure the investors 
who increase their shareholdings to behave properly, but not in the 
long end. For instance, at the beginning, a founder and shareholder 
holds 51% shares of his company, the remaining shares are for financial 
purposes to expand the company scale. Gradually, when business is 
booming and the controlling shareholder realizes that it is not cost-
effective to share profits with the minority shareholders, he may easily 
squeeze out the minority shareholders by any means other than tender 
offer to the margin extent that the company stays "listed". The agency 
cost between majority shareholders and minority shareholders is especially 
(_56) 
high in companies with concentrated ownership, and Chinese law 
particularly exempts the block shareholders from increasing shares 
through tender offer. In this case, from the beginning to the end, the 
minority shareholders cannot enjoy the premiums of the tender offer 
and their interests are at stake. 
A more common scenario in China is as follows. A financially sound 
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institutional investor acquired 30% shares of the company via negotiations 
and other means. This shareholder then stays quiet and every 12 
months, he increases 2% shareholding. According to Chinese Law, he 
does not have to send out tender offer for share increase, nor does he 
have to make any public announcements at al. After two years, _when 
this shareholder acquires approximately 34% of the company share, he 
obtains the veto power on virtually al major issues of the company. 
According to Chinese Company Law, any resolutions on revising the 
corporate charter, increasing or reducing the registered capital, merger, 
split-up, dissolution or change of the company forms shall be adopted 
(57) 
by shareholders representing 2/3 or more of the voting rights. As in 
(58) 
China, the Company Law largely ensures one-share-one-vote, thus 
shareholder with 34% company shares normally has 34% voting rights 
of the company. In this case, when board of the directors realized the 
potential hostile intentions of the shareholder, it is already too late. 
Under the "2% per year Rule", a Chinese shareholder can unboundedly 
increases his shareholding without sending out tender offer, which is 
unimaginable in European countries. Early in 1971, UK, Norcos 
Corporation announced its acquisition intent for Venesta International. 
To prevent the company from takeover, an individual shareholder, Mr. 
David Rowland, began purchasing the company shares in secondary 
market. Despite the fact that the share purchase was extremely difficult 
and went rather slow, Mr. David Rowland eventually became the 
(59) 
controlling shareholder of Venesta International. Nocors Corporation 
then made a complaint to the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers who 
later realized that Rowland's open market bulk buying "denied the 
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company's small shareholders the opportunity to sel at the favorable 
(60),, 
terms Rowland had offered . Based on this case, a new rule was added 
into the 1972 City Code on Takeovers and Mergers which require 
anyperson who purchased 40% or more of a company's shares to make 
a bid for the remainder, no matter how gradual he obtained those 
(61) 
shares. This rule lied the foundation for the long-standing Mandatory 
Bid Rule in City Code on Takeovers and Mergers. 
In China, astute institutional investors can utilize other loopholes in 
tender offer exemption to usurp and seize the control of listed companies. 
For example, when an investor promised not to transfer the shares 
within 3 years and got approval from non-affiliated shareholders, he 
automatically qualifies for exemption from tender offer without notifying 
(62) 
CSRC. Indeed, this investor has to hold the shares of the company for 
3 years, but this does not change the fact that he has obtained relative 
control of the company without offering an exit mechanism to the 
mino~ity shareholders through a public tender offer. In China, social 
ties play critical part in many aspects of doing business. In the corporate 
world, while non-affiliated shareholders are supposed to be "non-
affiliated", such a title does not cut their social ties with corporate in 
siders such majority shareholders, actual controller of firm or the 
(63) 
controlling shareholder. These bonds arise out of educational background, 
industrial overlap, shared regional origin, military service or even third-
party connection, representing informal connections that are not captured 
(64),, 
in conventional measures of "non-affiliate . 
In short, a major flaw of Chinese tender offer regulation is that, 
once the applicant obtained exemption from CSRC, he could find a 
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way to circumvent tender offer forever. "Once exempted, always benefits." 
This leaves abundant room for majority shareholders to outsmart 
minority shareholders. 
VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS 
A. Mandatory Bid Rule: A Rational Trigger 
The Chinese Mandatory Bid Rule has an initial trigger of 30% issued 
shares, while UK and most EU member states have a threshold at 30 
% shares carrying voting rights. Considering the non-tradable state-
owned shares account for a proportion impossible to ignore in total 
shares of most listed companies, the initial trigger point of Chinese 
Mandatory Bid Rule is much lower than UK and major EU member 
states. For wide range minority shareholders, it might be a good thing; 
but such a low-threshold Mandatory Bid Rule inevitably hinders takeovers 
from happening in the first place. Fewer takeovers means even fewer 
exit channel for minority shareholders, thus it is hard to say such a 
low-threshold of Mandatory Bid Rule is at the interest of minority 
shareholders. 
In China, the minority shareholders have a nickname of "chives", 
becausethey are easily "harvested" by the majority shareholders in the 
Chinese stock market. The knotty problem behind is the much poorer 
corporate governance environment in China compared to its counterparts 
in UK or EU. 
The biggest corporate governance problem in China is the agency 
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costs , insiders'control, and no functional proprietor of the state-owned 
shares. A very large proportion of shares in Chinese listed companies 
are state-owned shares, however, the State-owned Asset Supervision and 
Administration Commission performed badly over the past two decades, 
and the state-owned largest shareholder as the supervision entity of 
the management is virtually non-existent, causing even severer insider 
(65) 
control problems. 
Moreover, the supervisory board and the independent director system 
(66) 
functioned awfully in China. Due to poor institutional transplantation, 
it is almost impossible for the supervisory board to "supervise" the 
management, and independent directors in China are simply "rubber 
stamps" for the board of directors. 
Under these conditions, when China gradually opens its capital 
market, takeovers, especially hostile takeovers, may be an ultimate cure 
to Chinese corporate governance. In 2016, the Chinese government 
adopted supply-side reform to vitalize Chinese enterprises. Therefore, 
the whole industries are in desperate need of takeovers and reorganizations 
to better utilize social resources. In short, a higher threshold of 
Mandatory Bid Rule that facilitates takeovers is more optimal for China. 
Even from the aspect of the policy maker, setting the trigger low 
was trying to protect minority shareholders, but allowing partial tender 
offers overflow the security market was definitely not. In UK and al 
EU member states, once the acquirers trigger the Mandatory Bid Rule, 
general tender offer becomes compulsory while partial tender offer is 
strictly prohibited. This is to ensure equal and fair treatment for al 
al shareholders without any omission. From the experiences of UK 
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and EU, when obtaining shares to the extent of triggering the Mandatory 
Bid Rule, the acquirer usually has already held sufficient voting rights 
that may confer control, and the minority shareholders are in a weaker 
position. Therefore, the compulsory requirement of general tender offer 
only hasvery litle inhibiting effect on takeovers, but can improve 
minority shareholders'well-being significantly. 
In sum, current Chinese Mandatory Bid Rule has a trigger so low 
that hostile takeovers can hardly happen, but, partial offers instead of 
general offers are too frequently allowed in takeovers that the interests 
and lawful rights of minority shareholders are ignored. A higher trigger, 
combined with a stricter general tender offer requirementis optimal and 
imminent for Chinese securities market. Meanwhile, considering state-
owned shares percentage varies from company tocompany, and almost 
every listed company in China has its unique equity distribution, a 
flexible trigger is crucial. Denmark and Estonia has set a good example 
for China: "whenever an acquirer holds the majority of voting rights 
in the company or becomes entitled to appointor dismiss a majority 
of the members of the board of directors, he shall launch a general 
(67) 
tender offer for al the outstanding shares of the target company. 
As when the acquirer could be deemed as "holdingthe majority of voting 
rights in the company or becoming entitled to appoint or dismiss a 
majority of the members of the board of directors, it is optimal for 
the general assembly of shareholders to decide, insteadof a fixed standard 
from the CSRC. 
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B. Sell-out Right: A Reasonable Burden Sharing 
In European Takeover Directives, a bidirectional sell-out right and 
squeeze-out right co-exist with each other, whether to exercise these 
rights or not depends on the acquirers'or the shareholders'will. When 
this happens, the acquirer has obtained more than absolute control of 
the company, while the minority shareholders'together hold only 
insignificant amount of the company shares. In China, only sell-out 
right is entitled to the shareholders, and the trigger of the sell-out 
right is much lower than that of EU member states. 
Maximizing shareholders'value and protecting minority shareholders' 
interests is crucial in any countries'Company Law. Nevertheless, it is 
also crucial to realize that, the acquirer, or the bidder per se, is a 
shareholder of the company. General tender offer, like any other tender 
offers, usually opens to public for more than 30 days. After the general 
tender offer, shares remained in other shareholders'hands are shares 
they donot want to sel after thorough consideration. In many cases, 
when equity distribution of the company does not match the requirements 
in Securities Law, the acquirer is stil far away from becoming a 
controlling shareholder. In companies with institutional investors as 
the majority shareholders, or in companies with state-owned shares as 
the majority, even if the acquirer buy out the remainders, stil, he 
could not become the de facto controller of the company. 
Usually, a listed company losing its listing status is not solely due 
to an individual acquirer's purchase. When the market momentum is 
strong, any shareholders of the company may slightly increase their 
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shareholdings, including the majority shareholders and institutional 
shareholders. Thus, the acquirer should not be the only one to accept 
the residual shares when shareholders exercising the sell-out right. 
Luckily, when a listed company is at the edge of delisting, CSRC 
would notify the acquirer, and the acquirer can choose to reduce his 
shareholding to such an extent that the company stays listed; but again, 
the responsibility unfairly falls on the shoulder of the acquirer alone. 
In sum, the threshold of the current Chinese Sell-out Right is too 
low; like most EU member states, 90% is an optimal line for shareholders 
sell-out right. Moreover, it is rational that when minority shareholders 
exercising the sell-out right, al majority shareholders (according to 
their shareholding ratio) are together responsible for the remnant 
shares, but the acquirer reserves a preemptive right to acquire al the 
remnant shares. Meanwhile, if the acquirer choose to reduce his 
shareholding to keep the company stays listing, then he has the right 
to request other majority shareholders to do the same (according to 
their share-increasing ratio). 
C. Exemptions of Tender Offer: A Time Limit and Share Increase 
Amount Limit in Need 
In the City Code, there are certain exceptions from the Mandatory 
Bid Rule. For example, issuance of new securities approved by shareholders 
as consideration for an acquisition, rescue operation, acquisition of 
shares because of inadvertent mistake, holders of shares carrying 50% 
(68) 
of the voting rights state that they would not accept the offer, etc. 
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The European Directive grants the・supervisory authority of each 
member state the power to waive Mandatory Bid Rules in order to 
take account of specific circumstances. Even so, Cyprus, Hungary and 
Latvia did not stipulate tender offer exemptions, thus in those countries, 
a general tender offer for al shares of the target company is unavoidable 
once the Mandatory Bid Rule is triggered. In other member states, 
normally, Mandatory Bid obligation does not apply to acquisitions by 
inheritance, gift, debt enforcement or marriage. Besides, supervisory 
authority of other member states grant acquirers exemptions from 
Mandatory Bid Rule for other various reasons. The most common ones 
(69) 
are : changes of control is within the same group, restructuring or 
(70) (71) 
rescue scheme, temporary stepping over the mandatory bid threshold, 
dominant influence was gained for the purpose of carrying out a 
(72) 
merger or division, acquisition of control as a result of the exercising 
(73) 
of pre-emption rights, stepping over the Mandatory Bid threshold as 
a result of measures taken by the target company or by another 
(74) (75) 
shareholder and so on. 
Some member states have unique Mandatory Bid Rule exemptions. 
For example, shareholder cannot exert a significant influence on the 
target company (Austria), another person holds a higher percentage of 
voting rights (Finland), and the offeror has already obtained de facto 
control of the company below the Mandatory Bid Rule threshold 
(Germany) are al distinctive reasons for the exemptions of the Mandatory 
(76) 
Bid Rule. 
Compared with UK or EU member states, Chinese law on tender offer 
exemption is too complex. The exemptions of tender offer are divided 
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into application-based exemptions and non-application-needed exemptions; 
moreover, the application-based exemptions are further divided into two 
categories -exemptions from increasing shares by means of tender 
offer and exemptions from sending a tender off er to al shareholders 
of the target company. Even worse, the languages and expressions in 
relevant provisions are rather obscure and vague. Sweeping generalizations 
in twisted clauses unexpectedly leave more loophole for investors with 
ulterior motives. In comparison, exemption regulation is more substantial 
and strict in UK and EU member states; the literal meaning of the 
clauses is quite simple but crystal clear. 
In addition, for UK or EU member states, acquirers are just exempted 
from the Mandatory Bid Rule, but in China, acquirers are actually 
exempted from the tender offer. In UK or EU member states, even if 
acquirers obtained exemptions from the Mandatory Bid Rule, normally, 
the only way they could further increase their shareholdings is through 
tender offer; the acquirers just do not have to bid for al outstanding 
shares of the company. In contrast, in China, once the applicant has 
confirmed their exemptions from the CSRC, they can almost increase 
their shareholdings through whatever means possible. In practice, 
acquirers in China are scrambling to avoid even partial offers once 
they get the exemptions, and the minority shareholders are thereby 
isolated from the negotiation table. 
In sum, the Chinse Mandatory Bid Rule exemption is too loose, and 
acquirers can freely increase their shares through ways other than 
tender offer once they get the exemption. Only tender offer, especially 
general tender offer for al outstanding shares, can provide minority 
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shareholders with sufficient guarantee; and exemptions of Mandatory 
Bid Rule should not be a convenient weapons for corporate control. In 
view of this, a time limit of exemption as well as an amount limit of 
share-increase is urgent for the current law. First, 3 years after the 
exemption of tender offer, if the investor stil holds more than 30% 
shares of the target company, further acquisition of shares must through 
a general off er for al outstanding shares of the company. Second, less 
than 3 years after the exemption of tender offer, if the investor obtains 
more than 40% of the company share, further acquisition of shares 
must through a general off er for al outstanding shares of the company. 
vi. CONCLUSION 
This paper posed the question whether there is stil room to improve 
the Chinese tender offer regulation in order to better protect minority 
shareholders and at the same time take acquirers'interest into 
consideration. The answer clearly is yes. Three indispensable parts of 
currently Chinese tender offer regulation -the Mandatory Bid Rule, 
the sell-out right and the exemptions of tender offers -are al rather 
complicated than thorough, excessive than consistent. While relevant 
laws in UK and EU are exemplary for China, we should not ignore 
the heterogeneity of the Chinese securities market. 
Tender offer is a fundamental part in hostile takeover regulatory 
framework. Although stil grossly not ready in terms of dispute 
resolution and law enforcement, a hostile takeover era is coming as 
China continues to open its capital market. Acquirers in China rack 
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theirbrains to circumvent acquisition through tender offer. A sound 
and developed jurisprudence over tender off er helps to improve the large 
and diverse takeover regulatory framework in China. When this comes, 
corporate governance problems in China may not be as severe as they 
used to be. 
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